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Logos and Transience 
• 1n 
Franco Rella 
John Paul Russo 
Travel along every path, you will 
not find the boundaries of the 
soul, so deep is its logos. 
-Heraclitus, Fr. 71 
After World War II the cultural ambience of the Italian Left was 
defined variously by dogmatic Marxism, by the later Lukacs, by 
socialist realism, and by followers of Croce and Gramsci. In the 
1960s the Frankfurt School, French Marxism, and other "critics of 
ideology" began to exert a potent influence on Italian criticism. It 
was demonstrated (once again) that there could be no ultimate 
explanatory language or fact in isolation from its "resistance" or 
"opposition," that even the "means of production, in themselves 
isolated, do not explain or determine," but are "anticipated, re-
tarded, or crossed by ideological currents." 1 For their own 
purposes the Italian critics wished to recover and utilize the 
avant-garde, experimental, bourgeois art and literature of modern-
ism: Conrad, Mann, Kafka, Schoenberg, Musil, Rilke, Eliot, Joyce, 
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etc. "Modernism" had been condemned as "decadent" and "irra-
tional" by Lukacs on political grounds; it had also been attacked by 
the liberal humanist Croce and had remained outside the im-
mediate concerns of Gramsci. During the 1970s and early 1980s the 
twin concepts of "negative thought" and the "crisis of reason" 
strongly marked the cultural ideology of the Italian Left and en-
tered literary criticism. One can scarcely speak of a unified move-
ment, but it is possible to define a group of concepts, issues, 
methodological strategies, and representations that mark out a 
"generation." Franco Rella is a leading figure of this generation. 
Negative Thought and the Crisis of Reason 
In general, "negative thought" stands for the via negativa of the 
great modern thinkers and writers and the "twilight of the West" 
theme in the aesthetic historians (Burckhardt, Spengler, Schwab). 
There is an asserted affinity between "negative thought" and the 
sense of "fatuity" (or "frivolity") and "boredom" that was said by 
Hegel to characterize the transition between periods, in this case, 
between the modern and the postmodern. 2 Negative too is the 
relentlessly destructive character of the critique, Nietzsche's 
"philosophizing with a hammer." Freud's concepts of repression, 
the repetition compulsion, and the death instincts are "negative 
thoughts." Methodologically, negative thought bears a family re-
semblance to the younger (Hegelian) Lukacs and the Frankfurt 
School (although one cannot speak of influence - the relationship 
is as yet unexplored). In Adorne's negative dialectic, after 
the moment of thesis, the second moment is comprised of con-
tinuously proliferating antitheses; the third moment, toward 
synthesis, is either blocked or indefinitely deferred. "The saving 
principle ," writes Adorno on the decline of the individual, "is now 
preserved in its antithesis alone." 3 In modernity, so it was said, 
there could be no culture-as-synthesis whatsoever, no psychologi-
cal "wholeness," no "totality" of an "integrated civilization," not 
under existing modes of industrialism and the technocratic state. 4 
Instead, there is only the continuous flux of the fragmentary, the 
precarious, th e transitory, and the unbidden: Montale 's "vestigia l 
che il vuoto non ringhiotte" ("vestiges /which the void does not 
swallow") ("Debole sistro"). Finally, the "negative" is the word 
unsaid, the thought unheard, the silence in Rilke, Eliot, and 
Wittgenstein. 
Krisis (1976) is the title of Massimo Cacciari's diagnosis of 
fin-de-siecle German and Austrian culture. La crisi della ragione is a 
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collection of essays by various writers which touched off a sus-
tained debate when it appeared in 1979. The "crisis" refers to the 
failure of traditional logic and method fully to explicate the prob-
lems, modes of inquiry, enigmas, and "solutions" of modern writ-
ers and thinkers. 5 This failure synchronized with the collapse of 
classical physics at the tum of the century. As Giuseppe Sertoli 
comments, classical reason is based on the "mind's self-sufficiency 
and autotransparency (Descartes' cogito, Kant's lch denke) ... [it] 
silenced the 'language' of the body (the passions, the imagination); 
holding a linear and cumulative conception of time, it choked the 
voices of those who opposed the 'march of progress.' " 6 The 
coherence of the ego and history is purchased at the price of 
suppression or relegation to the non-meaningful. Romanticism of 
course revalued the non-rational upward, but it retained the epis-
temological premise and individualist viewpoint of the Enlighten-
ment; instead of expressing ideals of wholeness in terms of reason, 
the Romantics chose terms such as imagination, synthesis, and 
ideal form. Early modem critics (Babbitt, Eliot, Richards) con-
tinued to invoke concepts of humanism, reason, imagination, tra-
dition, synthetic form, synaesthesis, and equilibrium to describe 
psychological and cultural synthesis. But the humanist synthesis 
was a "fiction of a totality, a simulation of an impossible concilia-
tion; it is even more than an illusion, a trick-in so far as beneath 
the harmony of a proper order hides the disorder of reality"; and 
formalist criticism turned out to be an even sharper instrument for 
detecting textual non-synthesis. 7 
Cacciari locates the first signs of "crisis" in the immediate 
aftermath of German transcendentalism. The division between 
noumenon and phenomenon leads in Schopenhauer to "extreme 
pessimism" before the illusory quality of all representation. "The 
extraordinary logico-epistemological importance of Schopenhauer 
consists in his very deduction of pessimism." 8 Nietzsche's attempt 
to overcome the ascesis of Schopenhauer, inherent in his very 
logic, precipitates the "negative thought" and crisis. Nietzsche 
exposed the "immense plurality and contradictoriness of the real, 
irreducible to one meaning or one idea," "irreducible even to the 
unity of a theory of consciousness," comments Franco Rella; 
Nietzsche "uncovered, within this plurality, the conflictual plural-
ity of the subject" (CF, 13).9 The ego's unity and its knowledge 
were displaced by disunity and another, enigmatic "knowledge": 
the "reasons of the body," the "reasons of memory and experi-
ence" which lie beyond linear time and "classical reason" (SP, 70). 
Although Nietzsche retained the category of "the genuine" as an 
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ultimate ground of the ego and even equated it with the true, his 
"death of God" and displacement of "knowledge" precipitated the 
"death of the ego" (SP, 110), what Adorno called the "withering of 
the subject." 10 
To varying lengths, many Italian critics on the Left subscribe to 
the aggiornamento implied by negative thought and the crisis of 
reason: new forms of thought and imagining, of time and space, 
must be analyzed by new forms and methods of inquiry. Of the ten 
critics in Crisi della ragione, notes Rella, "at least five either take their 
movement from or confront Freud in their readings" (SP, 70). On 
their view, classical reason should be supplemented by Freudian 
condensation, displacement, the overdetermined, and opposition, 
with the "logic of the double," with the "atemporal" and "silen t" 
unconscious, with the free-association technique of psy-
choanalysis (CF, 36; CR, 151-53). Freud's concept of the "un-
canny," which he employed to investigate E. T. A. Hoffman and 
Michelangelo's Moses, brings to light the "contradictory tensions" 
that surround every "splitting" and "plurality"; as with his 
analysis of the "ultra-clear" no detail in the complex is "too little for 
analysis" (CF, 34-35). Wittgenstein also figures importantly in 
Cacciari, Rella, and other "negative thought" critics. The 
vanishing-point of their picture of modernity is perhaps Wittgen-
stein's critique of language, his conception of the "unsayable" 
forms of reality beyond verbal "limits." His "antimetaphysical 
mysticism" 11 led Wittgenstein to take from language - from refer -
ential language at the very least - the power of revealing, of iden-
tifying itself with the "sense of the world" (6.41): "What can be 
shown cannot be said'' (4.1212).12 What cannot be said is exactly the 
"sentiment" beyond the limits of the world. Thus, ethics (and 
aesthetics) lay beyond "facts" and language-"it is the space of the 
mystic and of silence," comments Sertoli: 
yet silence is but the reverse of the "great words" of classical ration-
ality , whose order and law it confirms while declaring, and suffer-
ing, its inadequacy. Unable to work through the mourning for the 
loss of the past ... silence shows melancholically that no language 
and reason at variance with the ruling ones can be formulated. 13 
"Italy" and Silence 
Negative thought and the crisis of reason have been primary 
themes in the work of Sertoli (b. 1943), Cacciari (b. 1944), and Rella 
(b. 1944). Sertoli, who is an immensely gifted literary critic and 
historian of ideas, holds the chair in English Literature and Lan-
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guage at the University of Genoa. One of his earliest papers was on 
Richards, Empson, and ambiguity (1967); longer studies include 
close readings of Swift, Hardy, Conrad, and Lawrence Durrell; Le 
immagini e la realta: saggio su Gaston Bachelard; essays on Derrida and 
Canguilhem; and introductions to Sterne's Sentimental Journey, 
Johnson'sRasselas, Goldsmith's She Stoops To Conquer, and Burke's 
Enquiry on the Sublime and the Beautiful. Sertoli acknowledges 
"negative thought" and the "crisis of reason" in his work, but his 
general superiority as a close reader-he ranks among the finest 
textual critics in Italy-prevents facile categorization. 14 Cacciari 
has a wide reputation as a political philosopher and cultural histo-
rian; a major theoretician of the Partito Comunista Italiano, he 
served for two sessions in the Italian Parliament (it must be said, 
however, that within the Party Cacciari has always been consid-
ered somewhat heretical). He is associated with the University of 
Venice. Rella, an extremely versatile and prolific critic, teaches in 
the Department of History at the Institute of Architecture at Ven-
ice. Sertoli and Rella serve on the editorial board of Nuova Corrente 
(Cacciari is on the masthead as a contributor), one of the leading 
journals in critical theory in Italy. All three critics have been con-
cerned with exploring the foundations of modernity and the post-
modern across a wide variety of disciplines. 
Cacciari writes mainly within an intellectual context of Central 
European thought; Rella draws on the same tradition but also on 
French structuralism and, in particular, Foucault; Sertoli has 
moved in the ambience of French phenomenology, poststruc-
turalism, and the English novel. There are, curiously enough, few 
and always incidental references to Italian writers or thinkers in 
their work. The absence of Italian texts marks the fact that Italy-in 
spite of Burckhardt's view that she had created the modern 
world-played a relatively minor role in the making· (and the 
teaching) of what we call "modernity," namely, the culture that 
succeeds the French and industrial revolutions and Kant. Yet in the 
writings of these critics, Italy is still the unsaid factor, the buried 
soul or, as Rella would say, the "silence." What can be said as one 
walks through Italy's cities and towns, her beautiful ruins and 
unsurpassed museums, and then confronts "modernity"? An ex-
treme response is Marinetti's Futurist denunciation: "We want to 
deliver Italy from its gangrene of professors, archeologists, tourist 
guides, and antiquarians. We want to get rid of the innumerable 
museums which cover it with cemeteries." 15 The opposite re-
sponse repeats the historical platitudes and apo logies for classical 
humanism. A third takes refuge in a merely antiquarian view of the 
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immense, 2500-year-long subject of "Italy." 
Neither Rella, Sertoli, nor Cacciari has of course Marinetti's 
remedy in mind. Rejecting the pieties of humanism, they do not 
choose antiquarianism either. Nonetheless, Italy as historical 
exemplar of humanistic culture is in some sense an object of attack, 
hidden rhetorically behind a variety of designated targets: the 
"classical," "culture," "reason," "humanism," the "universal," 
the unity of the ego, the individual, wholeness, synthesis, etc. 
"Italy" was identified so strongly with classical reason and 
humanistic education that the silence surrounding its name and 
tradition in the periods of crisis (1880-1920, post-1968) is therefore 
all the more intriguing. Rella speaks of the "disorder" and "evil" of 
the crisis (MA, 10), of the "great 'No' of negative thought which 
expresses mournfully the same urgency of eternity as the great 
'Yes' of classical culture" (SP, 96). Nietzschean echoes are unmis-
takable, and yet there is a poignant drama taking place in this 
denial of "the great 'Yes' " by a modern Italian in a borrowed 
rhetoric . 
The "crisis of reason" critics were the first generation to as-
sume positions of authority within the academy after the "crisis" of 
1968. At this time Italian universities experienced the first major 
shift in their fundamental structure in a half-century. The collapse 
of classical reason and concepts of negation, which had been a part 
of the cultural climate of northern Europe and America for decades 
(where Freudianism had become state religion in its field and 
close-reading techniques were a general given in analytical 
method), are really signs of the Italian times. The new ideology had 
conquered the high ground in certain sectors of the Italian univer-
sity system, finally displacing traditional humanism. The punish-
ingly insistent rhetoric of crisis and negation was meant if not to 
"strike the fathers dead" (for they had long since "died") at least to 
rattle their bones. 
In particular, Cacciari expresses no nostalgia for the "lost 
values" of humanist culture, nor even for "Marxist" humanism, or 
other myths of utopia or totality, all versions of "false conscious-
ness." His vision of Worker's Power appropriates the forms, 
means, and styles of capitalism and technology, ''l'uso operaio del 
capitale," which Sertoli maliciously depicted as "American con-
sumerism in overalls." It is the capitalization of the petty bourgeois 
and the complete reverse of Adorno's denunciation of the Ameri-
can way of life. Cacciari in effect rejects the Frankfurt critique of 
technocratic reason as a cultural nostalgia. In sum, Cacciari an-
nounces antihumanism . While Rella and Sertoli are mandarin in 
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their attitude toward Burckhardt's "culture of old Europe" and far 
less strident than Cacciari in their critique, they waste little time 
fighting rearguard actions with liberal bourgeois humanism. If The 
Magic Mountain were to be written today, and in Italy, there would 
be a hundred Napthas and no Settembrini. 
Rella and Freudian Criticism 
Two of Rella's major accomplishments are introducing a new 
reading of Freud to Italian criticism, and deconstructing Jacques 
Lacan. The Freud reading has had a marked influence on Cacciari 
and Sertoli. In 1977 Rella edited La critica freudiana and published 
"Testo analitico e analisi testuale" in La materialita del testo (both 
volumes contain essays by Sertoli). In his introduction to La critica 
freudiana and his contribution to Crisi della ragione, Rella took issue 
with French and American readings of Freud and exposed incon-
sistencies in their concepts of language and applied 
psychoanalysis. Dehistoricized, psychoanalysis was being used as 
a "social regulator" and maker of "natural" norms (CR, 165, 170). 
Although Rella esteemed Lacan highly as the "last great 'negative' 
philosopher" (CR, 166), he criticized him for erecting a new Freud-
ian orthodoxy, announcing the "true" Freud and proposing a 
"truth without adjectives ." Such a truth was seen as both "cause 
and foundation of a language beyond history (which is the place of 
pure manifestation) or culture (which is 'cloaca maxima')" (MA, 15). 
Lacan succeeded in "tearing psychoanalysis from the galley-ship 
of clinical practice" and in confronting it "with a cognitive and 
philosophical problematic." But he ended by restituting Freudian 
analysis to the very "philosophical 'compatibility' " (CF, 11) that 
Freud had struggled to eschew. 
In Rella's analysis, Lacan posits that language precedes the 
unconscious, "hides in its folds, to emerge as the language of 
being, and to manifest itself in sudden and dazzling epiphanies in 
which the subject (of the word, of the Logos) 'happens upon' 
truth" (CF, 19). To create "true" science in the present "arid time" 
of science, psychoanalysis must "restabilize" the language of 
"truth" (CR, 161). Although Freud spoke of the "precariousness" 
and plurality of language and knowledge resulting from the "im-
possibility of basing knowledge on values external to critical prac-
tice,'' in Lacan precariousness is the basis of ''another discourse,'' 
the "discourse of truth." History and society produce the "false," 
the "illusory," the "lacking"; but truth-stable and singular 
Truth-emerges within the structure of fiction. "From the Other 
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the subject receives even the message which it utters." This Other 
is the "witness of the Truth." The signifier lies within the "precari-
ousness" of the signified and marks a Truth "which exceeds, in 
every case, the real, and which constructs, in this very excess, the 
real as a structure of fiction, as an inexorable lack" (CR, 162). As 
Lacan describes the action of signifier: 
[it] demands another place, the place of the Other, the Other as 
witness ... because the Word by which it supports itself can lie, 
that is, place itself as truth. Therefore the Truth does not draw its 
guarantee from reality, which it concerns, but from elsewhere: from 
the Word. 16 
The separation between the signifier and signified "frees Lacan 
from any nagging thought about a rapport with reality." The 
analyst as "master" gains knowledge of the "name" or "word" of 
the unconscious, which speaks the "Truth" (CR, 162). Lacan con-
trasts positivist science with his own "idealist" notion of a "cause 
causing every effect," a contrast which for Rella is an entirely too 
"simplified" dialectic. From this point, it is but a short step to the 
later Lacan (post 1968) whose discourse resembles articles of 
"faith" supported by mystical allusions to Augustine, Saint 
Theresa, and to a God who "always intervenes." The analyst is a 
witness to the "horrible" nature of truth and to an "impossible" 
historical reality. Reason resides over a tragic, impotent will, over 
the "silence of a reality degraded to refuse and residue" (CR, 167). 
Rella objects to Lacan' s hermeneutical idealism and the belief 
that there is a truth hidden behind the veils of illusion, a single 
voice that speaks. Against Lacan Rella cites Freud to the effect that 
the "unconscious speaks more than one dialect" (13. 177). 17 These 
dialects speak across and through one another simultaneously, 
muffle each other's messages, and cannot be resolved, on any 
grounds, into a single language. It is true that Freud argued the 
distinction between "historical" and "material" truth (23. 29-30, 
267; 22. 191). "Illusions" must be analyzed into their historical 
antecedents, and these antecedents themselves must be subjected 
to yet another analysis, down to their material origins in a rejected 
material reality , in an unremembered past. In other words, there 
may be room in Freud for a "material" ultimate that is equivalent to 
Lacan's "Truth." However, Rella prefers to focus on Freud's em-
phasis on the contradictions between the parallel systems or the 
contradictions within the systems, on the inherent dualism and 
even the conflictual drama in Freud. He is always reminding us that 
distortion can occur to and fro along the tortuous route from 
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phantasies and illusions to material truths and that the process of 
analysis is without limit. According to Rella, the "real simplicity" 
behind the "legendary difficulty" of Lacan's work is its attempt to 
"show through its own discourse the structural lacks of language, 
the very lacks that make necessary the advent of the full word of 
Truth" (CR, 163). But, for Rella, psychoanalysis cannot pretend to 
"truth"; at best, it attains to "compromise-formations" that uphold 
society and culture (MT, 14). Lacan's "return to Freud" is thus 
aimed at accomplishing an end opposed to Freud's Unsicherheit 
("radical .uncertainty" ) (CF, 20). 
Also disputed are the postlacanian studies of Jean-Fran~ois 
Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari. Rella argues that the 
discourse of the Other, the omnipotence of the signifier, and the 
"full word" offers these critics a kind of redemption from the real; 
the real is effectively "relegated to the role of a phantom." With 
reality and its "knots" suppressed, they can let flow, "undifferen-
tiated and boundless, the productions of the unconscious (desire, 
libidinal energies) within a new natural totality" (CR, 166). Lyotard 
believes that Freudian theory imposes its own static system upon a 
body of texts that arose from conditions vastly different from the 
circumstances in which the theory was formed. There is neither a 
"displacement," "distortion," nor "material difference" between 
the representation and the underlying reality, because "represen-
tation does not in fact exist." There is but a "single and undiffer-
entiated flux" of desire, the action of the "instinctual apparatus" 
(MT, 12). 
Rella leans neither toward "closed" Freudian orthodoxies nor 
to the dissolution of psychoanalytic methodological potency. 
Rather, he interprets Freudian reading as an "open" activity, a 
"construction" ("costruzione," one of Rella' s key words), invoking 
the power of "refigurability" (CF, 15), like psychoanalytic tech-
nique itself. With his unusual ability to rescue an out-of-the-way 
text of a master, Rella focuses on Freud's "Constructions in 
Analysis" (1937) and "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" 
(1937). In these late papers Freud argued for "construction" (or 
"reconstruction") over "interpretation" as the "more appropriate" 
description for analytic technique. "Interpretation" applies to 
something that one does to some single element of the material, 
"such as an association." In "construction," however, one pro-
poses a narrative of early history that "has been forgotten from the 
traces which it has left behind": "the analyst has neither experi-
enced nor repressed any of the material under consideration: his 
task cannot be to remember anything. What then is his task? His 
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task is ... to construct it" (23. 261, 259). The analyst puts the 
"fragments" into the form of a story: "Up to your nth year you 
regarded yourself as the sole and unlimited possessor of your 
mother; then came another baby and brought you grave disillu-
sionment. Your mother left you for some time ... " (23. 261). 
Obviously interpretation and construction are complementary ac-
tivities; as Freud says, one must first "discompose" and then 
"recompose," but always devoting "micrological" attention to 
what is a kind of "microscopic anatomy" (CF, 34). 
Rella urges the dual activities of analysis and construction (SP, 
42). Analysis discloses the buried "traces," the "tensions," "uncer-
tainties," "contradictions," "stratifications," and "conflicts." 
Thus, the "shattering" of the classical ordo, beginning with 
Nietzsche's "hammer," meant a "dispersion" and "differentia-
tion" of the subject of inquiry. This destruction was the major 
achievement of the avant-garde writers and artists, an achieve-
ment perfectly articulated by Picasso's "I am the sum of my de-
structions." But then criticism must "build with the fragments and 
historicize them once again" (MF, 104). Construction, the second 
act of interpretation, is the making of an "incomplete surrogate" 
(CF, 28). One does not "unveil" or "enucleate" one sense, but 
elaborates a sense in order to render its "plurality" (CF, 25). At the 
interpreter's disposal lie not only ana lytic, dialectic, and Freudian 
method, etc., but also the contributions of the modern writers and 
thinkers, the figural and mythic methods which have increasingly 
supplemented science as models for "rationality." Rella affirms 
Freud's comment that the "only safe interpretation ... points to 
incompleteness" (23. 263) (Unvollstiindigkeit), and that the degree 
of uncertainty is not "assignable" (13. 65) (MT, 13-14). At the same 
time one must resist the very attractiveness of "incompleteness" 
(CF, 150), which can become fetishized. For Rella, aga in following 
Freud, the end of a psychoanalytic procedure is not to erect another 
pillar in the "myth" of psychoanalysis, but to perfonn a reading-
i.e ., the union of theory and practice, "excavation" of the particular 
materials down to the smallest details in which the contradictions 
manifest themselves. 
The relationship between "languages" of analysis and art 
becomes one of Rella's central problems. No single language has 
"autonomy"; each one is "untranslatable"; they "cut into each 
other reciprocally," each "putting its own structure continuously 
into play" (MA, 10). The unconscious is not a language for Rella, as 
it is for Lacan, but exists in a dialectical relationship to "lan-
guages." If critical language confines itself to one technical system 
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or even to the broader category of referential language, it inevitably 
suppresses through its own ideology the very material it was trying 
to unearth. Rella gives the example of Freud's attempt to "trans-
late" the dreams in Wilhelm Jensen's novella Gradiva (1903) into 
psychoanalytic language. The experiment ended by "complicat-
ing" the literary text "through rewriting it in a contradictory sys-
tem," which restored "to the text that density which Uensen's] 
very naive (or astute?) adherence to nineteenth-century aesthetic 
ideology (inspiration, creativity, etc.) had planed away in poetic 
form" (CF, 16). Such a critical rewriting in strict psychoanalytic 
terms only substitutes its own "truth" (CF, 125) for the author's, an 
act which Rodolfe Gasche calls an "excess of mimesis." 18 If lan-
guages are like distorting mirrors, revealing here and distending 
out of all recognition there, what language is capable of rendering 
the truth of art? What method can "guarantee the 'certitude' and 
'truth' of literature and the arts," for even Freud said that he must 
"lay down arms" before the "reasons" of poetry (CF, 20)? The 
quest for a critical language is the first duty of criticism. To the 
extent that Rella accepts this challenge and refuses to yield to 
irrationalism may reflect not only his profound debt to Freud, but 
also to his own humanistic education. 
From Concept to Gleichnis 
Rella' s proposal for a critical language assumes that contradic-
tions within the text are also "real" and traceable outside it, either 
to another text or the psyche or reality where they are subject to 
historical determination: the "solution" to critical oppositions, to 
"this contradictory constellation dominated by economic con-
tradiction," is the "distortion dominated by the ideology of the 
dominant classes" (MT, 17). The critical text initiates a "dialectial 
rapport with the original text but is always beyond it, in the sense 
that it is not a reconfirmation of it, but underlines it and produces 
newness from it" (CF, 194). To this end one must employ a lan-
guage of multiple functions: descriptive, referential, evalua-
tive . .. and poetic. The subject-object dichotomy must be bridged: 
he applauds the "absurd" method of Valery's Mephistofeles which 
"allows mixing body and spirit" and "oscillates among diverse 
fragments, constructing a possible transit among them without 
cancelling the differences" (M, 20). In his poem "Percorsi" (1973) 
Rella describes "la ruvida compattezza, incrinando" ("rough com-
pactness, cracking" [NP, 15]). One may compare the sculptor 
Arnaldo Pomodoro' s polished bronze spheroids cracked open here 
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and there to expose infinitely reticulated and partially disintegrat-
ing networks. For Rella, critical language must trace the jagged 
contours of the cracks, the breakage, the interstices. In an essay on 
Rella's poetry, Sertoli defines the critical act as a "furrow that 
excavates the compactness of every given, unlocking the closure 
and opening up differences where there had been the appearance 
of unity" (NP, 38).19 
For Rella, "completeness" would only impose false unity on 
the objects of investigation. To paraphrase Valery on writing a 
poem, one does not finish a reading, one only abandons it. Thus 
Wittgenstein's "silence" over the impossibility of rewriting Kan-
tian reason is superseded by the "fragments" of his language 
games (SP, 23). Benjamin's Passagenwerk remains unfinished after 
fifteen years, no formal structure being able to contain its "hiero-
glyphics," "phantasmagoria," "dreams," "ruins" (SP, 149). 
Musil' s Man Without Qualities possesses "interminability" (Unend-
lichkeit), a deliberately chosen "losing strategy" (SP, 57, 194). 
Nietzsche is quoted to the effect that "facts do not exist; rather only 
interpretations" (MA, 53). The "map" of Kafka's world must be 
"provisional" and "incomplete" (CF, 192), like an unknown conti-
nent with just a few rivers and mountain ranges sketched in. In 
Aragon's Le paysan de Paris, "error" unlocks the "doors of mys-
tery"; "confusion" contains the "locks" which "close badly on the 
infinite" (MF, 86). The endless Parisian streets represent the form 
and theme: frailty, transitoriness, "flanerie" and "prostitution." "I 
strive," said Aragon (a hundred years after Blake), "to elevate 
myself to the particular" (M, 87). In Max Klinger's Am Strande, the 
nude female bather recalls the undulating waters as she stretches 
out on the beach, her gaze caught in a "moment of metamor-
phosis . . . in which nothing seems to have either sense or limit" 
(M, 10). Klee's "country without frontier" is the "paradise of ap-
pearances" where the destruction of regressive memory becomes 
"liberating" (M, 10). As we have said, one of Rella's most fervently 
held assumptions is Freud's premise that interpretation and 
psychoanalysis are theoretically "interminable" but practically 
"terminable" when the "best possible psychological conditions for 
the functions of the ego" have been secured (23. 250). Freud inter-
preted Sandor Ferenczi's paper on terminating analysis as a "warn-
ing not to aim at shortening analysis but at deepening it" (23. 247). 
Likewise for Rella, interpretation is "interminable" (CF, 50; CR, 
171; MA, 53; MT, 13; MF, 103). Logos itself is not a being, but a 
"becoming" (CR, 154). 
The tension between "completeness" and "incompleteness" 
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is never fully resolved in Rella's criticism. This tension exists in 
literary texts, in critical methodologies, and is traceable to the 
underlying class conflict. Like Lukacs, Rella believes that the work-
ing class is the collective subject of the "new totality." But as Sertoli 
comments on Il silenzio e le parole, Rella' s "defense resembles the 
very mythology that he censures as the 'myth of progress' in 
classical (bourgeois) rationality. Moreover, how does such a hope 
for a new totality accord with the definition of reason as a conflict-
ing plurality of methods and procedures?" 20 
Not least of Rella's strategies is the figural power of metaphor, 
narration, and myth; in fact it marks the tendency in Rella' s criti-
cism from Il silenzio e le parole to Metamorfosi. Nietzsche's Zarathustra 
must be accounted an influence in this regard, as well as the later 
Wittgenstein ("What I find are new figures" [Gleichnisse] [MR, 5]). 
Figurability enables the critic to work "rather freely"; the figure is a 
movement of "another thought" across the literary image, holding 
together the "half-truths"; figures have "maximum abstraction of 
concept and maximum force that is defined gradually as myth, 
unreason, analogy, image" (MF, 8-9). A figure in Rella is not what 
is metamorphosized, neither the tenor, nor the vehicle, but the 
"complexity of articulation" of all the terms, the "structuring" of 
the ensemble (MF, 134). The "pleasure" of the image is only a stage 
which is undercut by the "conflict" of images and (what would 
appear) a cathartic "transformation into figures." 
A recurrent metaphor in Rella' s poetry is the journey across 
the modern metropolis, which initially appears "una grigia esten -
sione, uniforme" ("a gray extension, uniform," "Percorsi" [NP, 
15]), an unusual description for an Italian city, anything but gray 
and uniform, except perhaps in a few northern Italian cities in the 
dead of winter (Rella' s eye is unfortunately not on the particular in 
his poetry as it is in his criticism). Then, in disconnected sequence 
come the "murmur," "words," "spaltung" (splitting), "fantasies," 
"traces, houses, trees, steps, sounds, dreams, noises" (NP, 15, 20). 
While the catalogue bespeaks the open form of the postmodern, 
the walker either has or draws a "map" as he proceeds. He con-
fronts the "fantasma" of the metropolis, searching amid 
tautologies and obfuscations for a "senso preciso" to articulate the 
bombardment of impressions and find a "way" ("percorso"), a 
"representation." Impressions pile up and, with a suddenness 
resembling Rilkean shock, he discovers "this dazzling appear-
ance," this "presence." The preparation (if there is one) for "pres-
ence" comes in phrases like "constructing a crossing," "tracing," 
"measuring," acts of critical acumen. Other poems also end on 
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gnostic illumination; together they reveal Rella's desire for pres-
ence, Platonic light, and origin, as if to circumvent Musil's "the 
mystical has set; it cannot withstand the city" (MF, 17). 
"PROIEZIONE" (1973) ends with "istante," "future," and 
"speranza." In "Hors d(e !)'oeuvre" (beyond the work) (1974) Rella 
wants to quell the terror of "impassioned dreams" and notices the 
Petrarchan "light flowering," "your beautiful hair," "so gentle" 
("tanto gentile"), symbols of sexual fulfillment. These images of 
sudden presence-they occur near the end of their poems-seem 
like a leap of faith. They have their parallel in Rella's criticism with 
its contrary notions of fidelity to textual non-synthesis and the 
utopian desire for totality. 
Like a city, a text lies open to be "crossed," "measured," 
"plumbed" at every cultural and social level. From gray to "daz-
zling," from uniform to multiform, from absence to presence. 
To penetrate these densely-figured designs ("nuclei of maximum 
resistance," MF, 105) and to plot their connections with other 
designs is the aim of Rella's criticism. Some of his "figures of 
construction" are Kafka's hunter Gracco, Baudelaire's "king of a 
rainy country," Nietzsche's illness, Rilke's angels, Weininger's 
cultural politics, Franz Marc's edenic deer, the andersdenken and 
nontransmissibility of experience into language in Musil, Benja-
min's metropolis, and the "silent friend" in Freud (perhaps Rella's 
critical tour de force). 
Increasingly in his writing Rella attempts to tell a story or 
construct a myth by means of the images and abstractions taken 
from the text at hand. Myth for Rella, as for Serres, "organizes 
... a series of heterogenous images, each of which manifests the 
visibility of one aspect of the world" (M, 12). If the first act is critical 
(from Gr., critikos, whose Indo-European root means to "cut"), the 
second act is the imaginative reassembling of fragments, which 
requires the "hybridizing" of philosophical and literary discourse 
and places one structure across another. Thus, images and figures 
have more than a stylistic function in critical language. They or-
ganize a "construction of diverse cadence" and effect a "redemp-
tion" of fragments and images in their isolated senses (MF, 10). 
Rella notes that Freudian metaphor is not offered as a "poetic 
solution to 'what cannot be said.' "Instead it is a "construction" 
involving the possibility of naming that which has been "excluded 
by science and classical philosophy: the contradictory plurality of 
the real" (MT, 15). To this extent, myth or metaphor substitutes 
itself for instrumental reason; or Father substitutes its own 
"reasons," to make up for a lack of referential language. 
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The blending of "reasons" and styles of procedure had been 
practiced by modernist writers who "conducted their work to a 
truth which is not purely literary, but rather approximates 
philosophical discourse," the "essay" and a "scientific text" (M, 
158). Rella instances Freud's construction method of analysis in 
Totem and Taboo and the essays on Gradiva, Michelangelo's Moses, 
and the Oedipus story, and he notes that Freud had to defend 
himself from having written, in his study of Leonardo's childhood 
dream, a "psychoanalytic novel" (SP, 103; CF, 21). Most recently, 
Rella has studied the narrative method of Plato in the Phaedo, 
Symposium, Phaedrus and Republic (BV). The critic thus inhabits an 
"intermediate kingdom" (MF, 9, 17) where it is impossible to 
distinguish the "literary text," the" essayistic description," and the 
"narrative of events" (M, 158). Rella's poetry tends toward the 
philosophical; his criticism veers toward the literary. A critic is like 
the protagonist of a "novel" and, "rather than moving across real 
events and figures, moves across images and figures of thought." 
He participates in "strani incontri, strane avventure" ("strange 
encounters, strange adventures") (M, 159-60). All the same, writes 
Rella, the "novel" remains unfinished. It leaves off on a "percep-
tion of a new limit and of a new possibility" (M, 160). 
"Metamorphosis" and "battle" are Rella' s latest metaphors for 
criticism; his essays are like Ovidian tales of "modernity" or dialec-
tical "disputations." Nothing is fixed; everything is flowing from 
one form to another. Logos is subjected to analysis, is dissolved, 
and shown in all its partiality, contingency, and transience. Essays 
are not close readings of one or two texts, but are organized around 
a theme-the dream of reason, the black sun of the mystics, the 
end of night, Narcissus-and include numerous partial readings 
and allusions. At some points the interplay of cross-references tires 
and bewilders, and one's sense of literary history is scrambled. 
The tough-minded analyses in La critica freudiana and Il silenzio e le 
parole (the Weininger effect, Freud's silent friend, Nietzsche, and 
Benjamin) work with great intensity through historically resistant 
materials. The facts of the case control but do not confine critical 
intelligence . This is a formidable criticism that ought to be trans-
lated and studied. 
Not that Rella is unaware of the dangers of merging the analyt-
ic and literary methods. He compares his method to the confluence 
of two "seas" of thought, whose point of arrival is only "the 
beginning of a new departure, an invitation to a voyage to see new 
things which emerge from these and from those waters" (M, 161). 
Through figure and metamorphosis he will try to render "thinka-
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ble" what was presented historically as "unthinkable," that is, the 
"great silence," the "mute vertigo," the "intoxication," the "trans-
gression," the "excess" (MF, 104-5). The variety of sources, the 
intellectual sweep and boldness, the driving energy of Rella's 
enterprise give life to his new methods. But, again, the humanist 
strain is apparent in his refusal to accept any one logos or explana-
tory method as the complete explanation of "human nature." 
Logos/Logoi 
With "classical reason" and its associated concept of linear 
time one "reads" the world as if it were one's own nature. 
"Reason," Aldo Gargani writes, "is like a nature; on one side, as the 
nature of thought or more precisely as the 'natural laws of 
thought,' and on the other as the objective structure of the world" 
(CR, 9). For the negative thinkers, however, the laws of thought 
are "regulative" and not "constitutive" of reality. It is an "illu-
sion," writes Wittgenstein, to think that "the so-called laws of 
nature are the explanations of natural phenomena" (6.371). Two 
examples may serve to contrast "negative" thought with the 
"positivist" opposition: Anglo-American empiricism, pragma-
tism, and "common sense." At the time when Wittgenstein first 
went to Cambridge in 1911, any one suffering from Idealism could 
apply to Russell and study mathematical logic or repair to G. E. 
Moore for the cure of common sense. Wittgenstein's implacable 
brilliance drew immediate attention: "he thinks nothing empirical 
is knowable," wrote Russell, "I asked him to admit that there was 
not a rhinoceros in the room, but he wouldn't," not even after they 
"looked under all the desks. "21 Russell assumed the so-called 
correspondence theory of truth whereby the perceptions of the 
mind structure themselves in a way that corresponds to reality. 
That an empirical proof could be wrong is absurd, non-human, 
and therefore monstrous. On the other hand, the Cambridge 
Idealist J. M. E. McTaggart thought matter was only a "bare possi-
bility" with nothing to make it preferable to "any other hypothesis 
however wild" including belief in "Gorgons" and "Harpies." 22 
Here again the non-meaningful is imagined in terms of the mon-
strous. McTaggart also denied the existence of time, which Moore 
"refuted" by common sense: Moore said he was certain that he had 
breakfast before lunch. 23 
Classical Reason is a broad term: Plato distinguishes nous 
("mind," the organizing principle of the universe, wisdom, in-
tuition of the forms, of the Good), dianoia (deductive and 
analytic method, dialectical strategies), and dienotes (cleverness, 
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"brains"). 24 For Rella and other "negative thought" critics, how-
ever, "classical reason" normally means instrumental, technical, 
or Enlightenment reason, a highly selective version of Classical 
Reason made during the "crisis" of the aristotelian /ptolomaic sys-
tem in the early seventeenth century. Such a refinement parallels 
other narrowings of classical theory with regard to imitation and 
form in the High Neoclassic Mode. As Rella notes, while myth 
and magic had hitherto kept up relations with geometry and neo-
platonism, the Discourse on Method "interrupted the transit 
between Mythos and Logos" (M, 15). Instead of phenomena 
bounded by "sympathy" throughout the cosmos, they related to 
each other by cause and effect in the dimension oflinear time. "The 
new science do es not consider knowledge a going back to the past, 
a recollection of prisca philosophia, but a rupture with this past, and 
an increase and progress precisely because of this rupture" (M, 25). 
New life and "certainty" were given to "classical reason," oddly 
enough , by "tearing it from the senses" (MF, 13), that is, from the 
body and the body's memory with its idiosyncratic notions of space 
and time. The body was a "victim condemned to non-existence" 
(M, 15) and denied the right to plead its case. 
Rella chooses the "figures" of disease and the destruction of 
linear time to pierce through the body's "opacity" (M, 75) and 
allow it to articulate its counter-reasons. In The Magic Mountain 
Mann depicts fever as "full of contradictions." It renders the sub-
ject "more corporeal" or even "exclusively a body" and dissolves 
the line between the physical and the spiritual. While the subject 
lies immobilized, the heart races and the blood is felt coursing 
through tingling veins. At the fever's height, the body is inert, but 
images are thrown up from the most distant periods of the subject' s 
past. Unlike a dream which normally imposes its formal unity on 
material prompted by the previous day, the delirium of fever 
knows no limits of time or space; "it hurls fragments inexorably 
against each other, in a process of reciprocal extraneity" (M, 74). 
Ludovico Settembrini, who symbolizes the "European principle" 
or reason, progress, and civilization over against the" Asiatic prin-
ciple" of "immobility" and "quiescence," warns Hans Castrop that 
illness is the very form of depravity, resembling the putrefaction of 
death, a "feast" of a new life in which the body is no longer 
organized by the "spirit" with all its "impediments" and "respon-
sibility." The ringing affirmation of Classical Reason, notes Rella, is 
"strange" (M, 72) coming from Settembrini who is himself stricken 
with fever. It is not strange at all coming from a child of the 
Risorgimento. 
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Mann draws out the resemblance between the physical man-
ifestation of fever and orgasm, which as the "most acute and 
absolute pleasure" should lie at the furthest possible remove from 
the anguish of disease. But in both experiences, as Rella comments, 
the body dominates-in disease, with the onset of uncontrolled 
physical processes; in orgasm, with the body's "nudity," with its 
"weight," with its "opaque thickness" which is "shot through 
with an unbearable luminous shudder" (M, 74). The delirium of 
fever has affinities to sexual fantasy, particularly to those "fearful 
forms of love," the "strange and grief-laden deformations." Both 
the physician Hofrat Behrens and the psychiatrist Krakowski re-
veal "mysteries" to Castrop, the one with his x-rays of the thoracic 
cavity that encrypts the diseased tissue; the other with his revela-
tions of love's hidden forms, "relics of abandoned possibility, 
ready to take on new life." That we are on the border of the sacred, 
between death and life, notes Rella, is apparent from Castrop's 
response to seeing his cousin's pulsating heart under the x-ray: 
"My God, I see!" "The fever does not limit itself to exhibiting the 
body liberated from the spirit, but proposes, in disease as in cure, a 
non-human time," which has "neither beginning, nor end" (M, 
75). Likewise, when Castrop attempts to communicate with Clav-
dia Cauchat he finds himself needing to speak French, because 
"c' est parler sans parler." As Rella writes, it is the "language" which 
allows the repressed to articulate itself; the "language" approxi-
mates the silence of the eternal where "one does not speak at all" 
(MF, 40). 
Rella also shows that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein locates the 
metaphysical ego as a limit of the world, on the edge of silence . 
Wittgenstein recoils from the "horror of mixing" (MF, 19) and 
severs the psychological from the metaphysical ego: "The 
philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human 
soul which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the 
limit- not a part of the world" (6.641). It is another symptom of the 
unresolved dualism, a vestigial Cartesianism with its valorized 
cogito and a perception of the mystical "I." 
Under the new logoi, however, "temporal anomalies multiply 
themselves" (MF, 57). The "storm of progress" (MF, 22), the "time 
of precariousn ess" (SP, 105), the "crisis of reason" in the late 
nineteenth century, these conspired to "render perceptible 
another kind of temporality" (SP, 76). Nietzsche and Freud un-
dermined classical reason at its point of greatest resistance: its 
conception of the historical and individual past as an "unredeem-
able" thus it was, a chain of "naturally passed events" (SP, 108, 
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109). Thus it was is the "boulder which the will cannot move" 
because the will "cannot will backwards" (SP, 109). Under these 
blocking circumstances, as he describes several times in his works, 
Nietzsche discovered his central affirming idea of the eternal re-
turn. 25 It is a revolt against Idealism and other-worldliness and 
represents an attempt to rivet attention on present existence. Not 
just the good will be redeemed, but everything in all its misery and 
horror, with one note of hope: that the very idea that this is the only 
life, that it will recur over and over again (not of course in the same 
precise detail, but in its general character) would lead people to 
change. What is to be lived again could thus be different, possibly 
better; and so the future is redeemed along with the past. Rella's 
most penetrating observations concern the origins of eternal return 
in Nietzsche's biography. As Nietzsche characterizes the experi-
ence, it possesses many of the features described by Freud in "The 
'Uncanny' "(1919). Nietzsche speaks of the suddenness and terror 
with which the idea "assailed" or "overtook" him; a howling dog 
reminded him of a similar incident in earliest childhood; he felt in 
the grip of involuntary memory; the distinction between waking 
and dreaming was lost; and silence. The Freudian uncanny is 
defined by its displacement of linear time, the demonic, the mix-
ture of the familiar with the strange (or "un-at-home-like," Un-
heimliche) and the sudden return of some repressed element, which 
is ultimately a manifestation of the death instinct. The discovery of 
a new time leads to a new logical strategy by which to organize 
experience: no longer is "time" to be seen as linearity, the time of 
the "bourgeois city," ever fleeting into a past (SP, 109-10). Now 
time is redeem able. 
Despite Nietzsche's casting of his insight in quasi-mythical 
language, Rella interprets eternal return in essentially critical 
terms, as a breach in the citadel of classical reason. Hence his 
disturbance over Lacanian "reason" which ended by being as 
"strong" as the "reason" it sought to replace; it established its own 
totalizing premises, normative grammar, dominant practice, and 
Truth. Rella's deconstruction de-universalized it, permitted it to 
become one among a number of "reasons." Typically Rella calls for 
"flexible" methods (M, 17), Freud's "witch's reason" (CF, 22) and 
"slippery" reason (MF, 17); a "series of satrapies and partial 
dominions" (SP, 197); "dispersed," "plural," or "neo-classical" 
reason (MA, 17-18); "weak" reason, 26 low-keyed, without im-
perialist ambitions (CR, 172); "new rationality," that is, a "new 
capacity for representing the real" (CS, 9). Adopting the terms of 
Deleuze and Guattari, he speaks of "rhizomatic" (MA, 17) opera-
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tions: the humble rhizome is a rootlike horizontal stem lying just 
under or just above ground and sending out numerous roots from 
its underside and shoots or leaves from its upperside. He likens 
reason to "paths" through a "forest of signs"; the paths are "in-
terminable," "exhausting," and full of "conflict" and "struggle"; 
"the struggle that decides" (CR, 173); the pun on decide (fr. Latin, 
decidere, to cut off) allows meanings of determine, resolve, and cut 
through. But how much "resolution" can there be in an era that 
forbids closure? A rational project for Rella does not consist in 
raising plurality to a "metaphysics of difference," in "renouncing 
the will to transform reality," or in limiting itself to a "fascination 
with the abyss" (MA, 18). In Rella' s crossing the "paths" through a 
"scene" in Freud one observes his method in detail . The point at 
which he "cuts off" analysis, if not closure in the classical sense, 
indicates deeper intentions. 
Freud on the "Scene of Transience" 
Rella's analysis of the "silent friend" episode in Freud has 
major biographical interest, bringing together Freud, Rilke, and 
Lou Andreas-Salome. It has close readings of poems, letters, diary 
entries, and a Freudian "story" and combines the best elements of 
his method-figure, metamorphosis, displacement and redemp-
tion of time (linear, eternal return, constructed), plurality of voices, 
and "reasons." His focussed attention on one episode with all its 
ramifications seems to have acted as a limiting agent on his 
rhetoric. The deep background of the episode is World War I and 
its themes are the universal ones of nature, death, and eternity. 
Freud himself speaks in this profoundly moral tale, though in the 
hushed oblique tone of the modem, with a prophet's authority. 
Rella's ingenuity deserves praise because the episode did not lie 
ready to hand, or else it would have attracted far more commen-
tary. 
In November 1915, on the invitation of the Berliner Goethe-
bund, Freud wrote a brief note Vergi:inglichkeit ("Transience") for a 
book of essays Das Land Goethes (1916: "The Land of Goethe"). 27 
Containing contributions from prominent German writers, the 
book was meant to show that Germany was not the barbarous 
country painted by the foreign press. It was the land where Goethe 
and fellow poets and thinkers flowered and where the human 
spirit was affirmed. Earlier in 1915 Freud had written "Thoughts 
for the Times on War and Death" and was under no illusions on 
either subject. Rella explains that Freud quietly signals a doubt 
about the enterprise of Das Land Goethes in his title, "Transience." 
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The brevity of the.note (eight paragraphs) is also a mimesis of its 
subject matter. 
In "Transience" Freud recalls "a walk through a summer 
landscape in -full flower" in the summer before the war (1913) "in 
the company of a silent friend and a poet already well-known 
despite his young age" (14. 305). 28 The despondent poet finds no 
solace in the natural beauty which will vanish by winter. It only 
quickens his awareness of the precariousness of all things, the 
"sinking into transitoriness" ("Versenkung in die Hinfalligkeit"), 
and the ultimate meaninglessness of human values and achieve-
ments. No single thing could be truly enjoyed in light of this 
knowledge of inevitable loss. Freud countered by speaking up for 
the certainty and beauty of nature and humanity. Transience is 
"painful" but "true"; it destroys illusions of permanence and to 
that extent it has a certain value; but it does not negate the "beauty 
and perfection" which have immediate value in our emotional 
lives. Transience and "limitations" on the possibility of pleasure 
constitute an "increase" of value. Freud makes an analogy to 
natural flowering and alludes to Nietzsche's eternal return: "Each 
time nature is destroyed by winter it comes again next year, so that 
in relation to the length of our lives the return can in fact be 
regarded as eternal" (14. 306). 29 
Freud failed to convince or console his companions and he 
began to think of their predicament in terms of "mourning," of 
their anticipated grief over nature's death in winter (eventually 
these thoughts led to his paper "Mourning and Melancholia" 
[1915; pub. 1917]). Turning back to the present but retaining the 
nature metaphor, Freud wrote that the War "has devastated the 
beauty of the countryside through which it had passed and the 
works of art it met with .... [It] has revealed our instincts in all 
their nakedness and let loose the evil spirits within us·which we 
thought had been tamed forever by centuries of continuous educa-
tion by the noblest minds" (14. 307). Nonetheless he felt confident 
that sometime after the War "our mourning" would eventually 
come to a "spontaneous" end. Then the libido would once again 
become "free (in so far as we are still young and active) to replace 
lost objects by fresh ones equally or still more precious." Shorn of 
the illusion of permanence, we will have learned to value even 
more highly the masterworks of civilization. "We will return to 
reconstruct everything that the war has destroyed," Freud con-
cluded, "perhaps on a foundation more solid and enduring than 
before" (14. 307). 
With so many riches elsewhere in the Freud canon scholars 
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never gave much attention to "Transience." The standard editors 
did not identify the other individuals or the setting, referring only 
to Freud's sojourn in San Martino di Cartozza in the Dolomites in 
the summer of 1913. Nor did Ernest Jones offer an explanation; he 
interpreted the note simply as an "irrefutable denial of the com-
mon belief in Freud's supposed pessimism." 30 Then, in 1966, writ-
ing in the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Herbert Lehmann proposed that 
the younger poet was Rilke and that the "silent friend" was Lou 
Andreas-Salome. His main and virtually definitive evidence was 
Andreas-Salome's Freud Journal (1958) and the comment of her 
editor Stanley A. Leavy that she tended "to be silent in Freud's 
circle." 31 Max Schur, Freud's doctor in his last decade, accepted 
Lehmann's identifications, but attached no particular importance 
to them: "Transience" was another illustration of Freud's "basic 
love of life and serenity." 32 Rudolph Binion mentions Andreas-
Salome's introducing Rilke to Freud, but not the connection to 
"Transience." 33 In a study of Freud's prose, W. Schonau said that 
the note was a "fiction," a "piece of romantic prose" (SP, 77). 
For Rella, Freud's countryside in full flower is a "text," a 
"figure" which he calls the "scene of transience" (SP, 74). Its 
blossoming and decay symbolize Goethe's land in its darkest hour. 
The individuals and the historical setting, with the mysterious 
clues, must be identified in order to decipher as clearly as possible 
the "dischrony," the "unevenness," the "conflict," and the "plu-
rality of dialects of the unconscious" that are speaking across each 
other. Indeed, the scene has all the character of a dream in its 
precision, its overdeterminedness, its "uncannny" double time 
and remembered quality. Rella therefore poses a series of ques-
tions: ''What does the affirmation of 'a foundation more solid and 
enduring than before' mean in a context in which one affirms that 
the negation of transience is only a desire lacking any value in 
reality?" "What is the sense of this text, so clear, yet to result in 
something so totally hidden in this clarity and therefore incom-
prehensible ... ?" "Who speaks in this tale?" "Who is silent?" 
"What are the words and the silence saying?" (SP, 78) The solution 
to these questions begins with the text but ultimately lies beyond 
the "scene of transience," in the other writings of the three per-
sons. 
The external evidence may be briefly stated. In her Freud 
Journal Andreas-Salome wrote that she introduced Rilke to Freud 
at the Fourth International Congress of Psychoanalysis in Munich 
in 1913. "They took a liking to one another; so much so that we 
remained long together, also in the evening and late into the night. 
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The day after the Congress (9 September) with Freud in the court-
yard garden" ("Hofgarten") (SP, 83). 
The time of year ("summer ... in full flower") is exactly right; 
Rilke was relatively young (37) and "already well known." While 
"Hofgarten" is not a "summer landscape" ("Sommerlandschaft") 
Freud may have chosen the latter geographical term better to evoke 
the "land" of Goethe; and besides, as Lehmann notes, "we should 
grant Freud some poetic license in setting the mood for his es-
say. " 34 Moreover, Freud mentioned Rilke in a letter of 9 November 
1915 and met with him in either November or December 1915, that 
is, during the period of his writing "Transience." Later Freud 
wrote Andreas-Salome that "clearly with him one cannot 'con-
clude an eternal alliance' "(27 July 1916). In Lehmann's view, Rilke 
"thus impressed the character of transience on his relationship to 
Freud." 35 
When Freud met Rilke in Munich in 1913 both men were in the 
midst of deep personal crises. Jung was proposing major changes 
in Freudian theory (e.g., identifying the sexual libido with the 
Bergsonian elan vital). Freud had come to the Congress with the 
deliberate intention of defending his position. Jung's defection 
hurt Freud, not least because he regarded Jung as perhaps his 
ablest successor. It is likely the confrontation with Jung came on 
the very day that Freud met Rilke. But at this time Freud was also 
bringing about what Jones considered one of the two "fundamen-
tal" alterations in his theory by way of his studies in narcissism. 36 
Moreover, the coming of war and the realization of its meaning for 
Western civilization put any personal developments into an 
enormous tragic perspective. "I know for certain," he wrote to 
Andreas-Salome on 25 November 1915, "that I and my contem-
poraries will never see a happy time again" (SP, 76). With so many 
changes in Freud's life, there were many reasons for him to feel a 
sense of "transience" during these months. 
Rilke's melancholy was even more grave, because it struck at 
the root of his creative power. Work on his Duino Elegies had come 
to a halt after the third Elegy precisely over the question of the 
irretrievable flight of things into the "surging abyss." Parts of 
others were written but to the wandering Rilke they seemed a 
semblance of his own fragmentary life: "my body is become like a 
trap" (M, 147). Initially, Rilke had hoped to "construct" new 
"reasons" for existence (SP, 83) in the Elegies, reasons based upon 
his fleeting perception of permanence, an "angelic order" beyond 
change. But in 1913 Rilke was still the poet of flux. "Beauty's 
nothing/but beginning of Terror" ["Schrecklichen"], he wrote: 
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"Each single angel is terrible./And so I keep down my heart, and 
swallow the call-note of depth-dark sobbing" (1. 4-5, 7-9).37 In 
Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1 'terror'' or 1 'fright'' (Schreck) is 
distinguished from "fear" (Furcht) and "anxiety" (Angst) by the 
element of surprise and unpreparedness for danger (18. 12-13). 
Schreck is sufficiently powerful to break the "shield" that protects 
the ego from the repressed and is associated with the return of a 
repressed episode, a compulsion to repeat, and a manifestation of 
the death instinct (18. 31). According to Rella, the angelic percep-
tions of another order of being come to Rilke as a "shock": "I 
should fade ["ich verginge"] in the strength of his /stronger exis-
tence" (1. 3-4). The angels "shock" repeatedly ("Every angel is 
terrible" ["schrecklich"], 2. 1) and break up the repetition of habit: 
There remains, perhaps 
some tree on a slope, to be looked at day after day, 
there remains for us yesterday's walk ... 
. . . a habit that liked us and stayed and never gave notice. 
Elegy 1. 13-16 
The angelic experiences shatter the ego's hold on the id's own 
coherency and firmness; they precipitate awareness and fear of 
death. Can one overcome death? The self is impotent before the 
laws of natur e and society. Indeed, before Rilke could surmount 
his paralyzing experiences of transience he wa s to fall into deeper 
melancholy during the War. He wrot e in Augu st 1915: "the world 
has fallen into the hands of men. " 38 
Impotenc e and omnipotence, the "uncanny" or doubling, and 
narcissism were themes in the writings of both Freud and Rilke in 
the period 1912-1915. In Totem and Taboo (1913) and "Narcissism: 
An Introduction" Freud redefined his theory of the drives and 
proposed an intermediate stage in the development of libidinous 
impulses: an infant 's impulses have organized themselves but 
have not yet found an external object and so become attached to the 
ego; or rather "his egoistic instincts and his libidinous wishes are 
not yet separable" (13. 89-90). This is primary narcissism, a residue 
of which remain s through life. It is succeeded by what Freud called 
"secondary narci ssism": object libido which had been attached to 
the mother is returned to the ego. Some of this object-libido even-
tually finds its way to other objects; if not , the object-libido remains 
fixated upon the ego. Freud believed that some narcissistic fixation 
is necessary-it manife sts itself in various forms of self-regard - in 
order for the individual to protect himself and allow for a restora-
tive withdrawal in the event of loss (otherwise there may be no 
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libidinal projection later on). But the inability to surmount the 
phases of narcissism leads to obsessional neuroses: hypochondria, 
masturbation, homosexuality, and delusions of grandeur that 
mask an underlying helplessness. 
Rilke had written the idea of Narcissus into his second Elegy: 
he is the figure whose only joy is a memory of lost moments that 
strike by surprise and fright: "suddenly, separate mirrors,/drawing 
up their own outstreamed beauty into their own faces." The mirror 
in Freud is a form of doubling that represents an assurance against 
death in primary narcissism; its dream counterpart is "doubling or 
multiplication of a genital symbol" as assurance against castration. 
"But when this stage has been surmounted, the 'double' reverses 
its aspect and instead of an assurance of immortality it becomes the 
uncanny harbinger of death" (17. 234). Rilke probably began two 
poems on Narcissus in the spring of 1913. One begins "Narziss 
verging" ("Narcissus was perishing") and describes his love for 
what is being lost, the precarious, up to his own death; as Rella 
comments, it recalls the fainting episode in the first Elegy (M, 147). 
In the second poem, Narcissus sees the floating image of his double 
in the pool, has the narcissist's feeling of megalomania, and at the 
same time recognizes his impotence and inability to love: he is 
being lured by his double to plunge into the pool and drown: 
All my boundaries are in a hurry, 
plunge from me and are already yonder . . . 
What is reflected there and surely like me, 
and trembles upward now in tear -blurred lines, 
might perhaps come to being in some woman 
inwardly; it was not to be reached .... 39 
His desire to have his image live in the generalized "some woman" 
may trace to the infant's love for the mother, the first object of love 
beyond itself; but this attempt fails. "Narcissus recognizes death 
within himself the moment that he loses himself in his gazing 
outward," writes Rella, "so that even though he closes himself in a 
circle, he cannot save himself from the transience of the world" 
(SP, 85). 
To review Rella's evidence: there are two historical times, the 
summer before the war and the late fall of its grim second year. A 
young poet captured by the precariousness of nature opposes a 
middle-aged man who accepts it, sees it as heightening the value of 
things, and feels the seasonal cycle as a balm to the soul. There are 
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also two conceptions of temporality: linear time leading toward 
death; and cyclical time, the eternal return around the center of the 
self, involving death and rebirth. 40 At this point in his career Rilke 
chooses "habit" to stabilize the ego and withstand change, a re-
gressive act in its focus on repetition and refusal of new stimuli. 
The choice commits Rilke to "transience" and to "silence." The war 
initially seems to confirm Rilke in his position. However, through 
its sheer magnitude the war introduces a new category: the "un-
sayable," the "silence of the indescribable" (SP, 85): 
minds of murders 
are easily divined. But this, though: death, 
the whole of death . . . 
this is beyond description! (4. 82-85) 
According to Rella, the war is "beyond description" because its 
destructiveness has "corroded" the language through which we 
"represent and dominate" the world, even the world of transience. 
Death represents the unsayable "remainder" ("il resto," what is 
left over), proving that our domination is not "perfect." In 
"Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," Freud wrote that 
death was as "unrepresentable for the primitive savage as it was for 
everyone of us today" (14. 293). His whole effort was to construct a 
logic to explain this "remainder," outside the boundary of "moral 
control": the "immutable law of death." As Max Schur para-
phrases Freud, "in recognizing death intellectually man can hope 
to overcome not death, but his fear of it." 41 
The Silent Friend 
Before Rella can present Freud's, Rilke's, and Andreas-
Salome's separate resolutions of the conflict beyond the "scene of 
transience," other voices, the "silent friend," and the land itself 
must be allowed to "speak." The first voice is Goethe's; Freud is 
writing an essay for "Goethe's Land" and is crossing "the coun-
tryside of Goethe," that is, rethinking the dimension of Goethean 
"salvation," which is the "solution" of the culture of "classical 
reason" (SP, 81). Freud's title "Verganglichkeit" seems to point to 
"Alles Vergangliche," from the Chorus Mysticus that concludes 
Faust: 
Alles Vergangliche 
1st nur ein Gleichnis; 
Das Unzulangliche, 
Hier wird's Ereignis; 
All that perishes 
is only a figure; 
the inadequate 
here becomes event; 
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Das Unbeschreibliche the undescribable 
Hier ist' s getan; here is accomplished; 
Das Ewigweibliche the eternal feminine 
Zieht uns hinan. leads us upward. 42 
"That transitory things have only symbolic significance," writes 
Hans Eichner, was "almost a commonplace in the Age of 
Goethe." 43 Faust's world is often raucous and messy, made of evil 
temptations, full of dizzying mutability. For Goethe the greatest 
experience of mutability was the French Revolution and its 
Napoleonic aftermath. Only through self-realization could the in-
dividual find salvation and conquer the "anguish of change" (SP, 
80). The devil's pact set death and nihilism (staying "fixed" upon 
pleasure, self-indulgence, yielding up the self) over against a con-
tinuous urge to self-realization. But this ideal of self-realization 
required training the self to "desist," to "renounce" the pleasures 
of the fleeting moment . The individual must learn that the only 
solid thing is the soul's constancy, the "coherence of the ego." 
Adorno refers to the Goethean solution as a "dialectic of tact," an 
awareness of the "inhumanity of progress," the "threatening im-
possibility of all human relationships in emergent industrial soci-
ety." A holdover from the courtesy of Renaissance high culture, 
tact ("and humanity-for him the same thing-") is the "saving 
accommodation between alienated human beings." 44 
Rella translates Unzulangliche as "inadequate" instead of the 
more common "unattainable" or "inaccessible"; what belongs to 
the world of Gleichnis (sign, figur e, comparison) cannot fully ex-
press what is beyond it; "here" in the world only an "event" can 
express it. For Rella, Goethe's final lines do not mean that the 
Eternal Feminine draws upward to heaven, purity, or divine for-
giveness; rather, it draws the "subject to itself"; guarantees and 
inspires its const ancy; provides an eternal found ation for it; brings 
it to the "height " of its value. Faust saved himself by freely re-
nouncing nihilism . His solution is one of the great models of 
classical realism (or bourgeois idealism). In a time of catastrophe, 
however, the "indescribable" has been "accomplished," the 
choice has already been made for nihilism. The way across and 
"upward" ("ci sublima") over "transience" is no longer "practical" 
in the same sense (SP, 80). The fragments will not cohere through 
being read as a symbol of another wholeness, through being rescued 
"upward in sublimation." Transience cannot be redeemed; it can 
only be suppress ed. And not for long: "all my boundaries are in a 
hurry." The modern writer must walk through suffering and death 
to "find new figures." 
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Rella's emphasis on the coherence of the subject refers him 
back to the "scene of transience" for a final time and to the one 
element in it that remains "silent": the friend. Who is the friend? 
Lou Andreas-Salome seems almost overdetermined to fill the role 
of the third term and resolve the conflict between Freud and Rilke. 
She was the friend in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. For Nietzsche, who proposed to her, she came to sym-
bolize the Eternal Feminine as he indicated at numerous places in 
his writings. As the muse of Rilke, she came to think of herself in 
terms of the Eternal Feminine and "eternity": in short, Goethe's 
way. 
For Rilke, what discursive practice leaves unsaid is "Death" 
("beyond description"); for Freud, it is the "residue" uncontained 
by classical reason. For Andreas-Salome, it is something close to 
Goethean eternity. Freud could not have chosen a better epithet for 
her than the "silent friend" because silence (a representation of 
eternity in her weltanshauung) and friendship were her signature 
virtues. "Every desire," she said, "yearns for eternity, for a deep, 
deep eternity," "independent of every analytic consideration" 
(SP, 88). "Being friends," she wrote in "Thoughts on Lovers' 
Problems," meant sharing "reciprocal solitude in order to deepen 
it. ... Friends means, then, protector against every losing solitude 
in anything whatever -him self included." 45 These virtues of 
friendship and silence she brought to perfection; together they 
gave her intuitions of pure Being: 
The persons of our most remote past, against whom we have 
sinned, separating ourselves from them, rise again: no, they are 
present as always, marked by eternity-solid and tranquil; one 
thing alone with Being itself. (SP, 89) 
In whatever she wrote her fundamental idea shone through. Such 
is the case with psychoanalytic language-she was a practicing lay 
analyst for many years after 1913- and her theory of narcissism. 
Andreas-Salome's theory of narcissism seeks to find a topo-
graphical setting within psychoanalysis for what is basically the 
Romantic idea of the eternal unity of being. For her, narcissism is 
not only a phase of individual development but endures "in all the 
subsequent object-cathexes of the libido-which in fact, in Freud's 
metaphor, stretches forth pseudopods to objects, like the amoeba, 
only to withdraw them when need arises." In keeping with Freud's 
conflict between the libido and the instinctual ego energies, but 
opposed to his belief in the regressive nature of narcissism, 
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Andreas-Salome describes narcissism as facing in two directions, 
one toward "self-assertion" and the other toward "abandonment 
in the primal boundless state," a "deep identification with the 
totality." Libidinal energies in the service of individuation, which 
manifests itself in egoism, are responsible for the great tragedies of 
mankind. She rejects Freud's later motto "Where id was, there ego 
shall be" as going in entirely the wrong direction. It is to the id that 
one must repair for value. Friendship, for instance, possesses a 
"climate of asexuality, rooted not in mutual eroticism, but a tertium 
quid," which is a sublimation of the "most archaic autoeroticism." 
Freud's primary narcissism thus becomes responsible for universal 
love, "autonomous judgment," the intuitions of "all-en-
compassing, all-supporting Being." Finally the artist returns to his 
primary narcissism when he wishes to discover the truths that he 
shares with his audience, allowing him to be at the same time "fully 
personal" and "universal." His labor results in a work which is a 
"guide to blessedness," a "rejoicing in the incredible fullness of 
union. "46 The idea is perhaps a restatement of the Rousseauistic-
Wordsworthian "sentiment of being," a kind of cosmic conscious-
ness. Freud repudiated similar notions of the "oceanic sensation" 
in his discussion of Romain Rolland in Civilization and Its Discon-
tents. 
Andreas-Salome's revisionism was unacceptable to Freud, 
who warned her seminar against turning narcissism into a "key to 
every possibl e residue." Her theory was a "receptacle for unsolved 
residues. "47 Unsolved-and unresolved, like other dualities in her 
work, "spirit/fle sh, ego/sex, active /reactive, objective /subjective, 
analysis /synthesi s," her "penchant for ambiguity," her theori es of 
bisexuality. 48 Rella ought to have pursued further Andreas-
Salome's oppositions on the "scene of transience": she was almost 
as "burdened with tensions" as Rilke and Freud. But Rella does 
show that her "eternity" was finally unacc eptable to Rilke. In The 
Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge he rejected the "third" term, the 
Romantic "eternity" and the "silenc e" which hides a "real con-
flict": 
Was I an imitator and a fool that I needed a third person to tell of the 
fate of two human beings who were making things hard for each 
other? And I ought to have known that this third person who 
pervades all lives and literature s, this gho st of a third per son who 
never wa s, ha s no significance and must be disavowed. He is one of 
the pretexts of Nature who is always endeavoring to divert the 
attention of men from her deepe st secrets. He is the screen behind 
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which a drama unfolds. He is the noise at the threshold of the 
voiceless silence of a real conflict. 49 
Andreas-Salome herself came to recognize the inadequacy of 
"silence," not from the War, but from Rilke's death in 1926. Writ-
ing to Freud on 20 May 1927 she said that she could not express a 
"new experience" which was "unexpected." It derived from "some-
thing infinitely sad and linked to the death of Rainer." Does this 
show her bondage to transience and the failure of her concept of 
narcissism? Somehow she must break her "silence" (SP, 89): 
some ten years ago the important thing for me would have been 
loss, the abominable despoiling .... Now it is something strange 
... to begin with it was an augmented suffering-something like a 
cry-the fact that I could not tell you any more about it .... Now it 
is almost as if Rainer were there under my trees, living their autumn 
or their summer, their winter and their spring. No absolutely, it is 
impossible to express it clearly. But after the death of Rainer I am pressed 
by the need to speak of it with you. 
Freud's memorial note on Andreas-Salome does not mention 
this development. She remains the "silent friend" portrayed in 
"Transience ." Rella considers Freud's "silence" to be an unre-
solved conflict in his own position and suggests a distant relation -
ship to the attitude of women expressed in Weininger's Sex and 
Character (1903), where the woman is the "unconscious," "plural-
ity," "heterogeneity," and lack of boundedness (SP, 34). Rella 
terms it the "Weininger effect," a resurgent antifeminism operat-
ing throughout Middle European culture at the turn of the century 
and accounting for the extraordinary popularity of Weininger's 
book. Freud writes in the note that Andreas-Salome "never spoke" 
of her literary works, but neither does Freud, nor does he mention 
her contribution to psychoanalysis. What could be more appro-
priate than some reference to these works by the founder of the 
subject? Rella underscores the points at issue, beginning with the 
curious circumlocution ("It was known ... It was well known") 
by which Freud explains how he learned of her past, never allow-
ing her to "sp eak" (although individuals are not normally quoted 
in memorial notes about themselves): 
It was known that as a girl she had kept up an intense friendship with 
Friedrich Nietzsche .... It was well known, too, that many years 
later she had acted alike as Muse and protecting mother to Rainer 
Mari a Rilke .... But beyond this her personality remained 
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obscure .... She never spoke of her own poetical and literary works. 
She clearly knew where the true value in life was to be looked for. 
Those who were closer to her had the strongest impression of the 
genuineness and harmony of her nature. (23. 298) 
Silence and the Eternal Feminine, sustaining one person after 
another, govern the passage. Andreas-Salome can only "speak" to 
another woman: "My daughter," concludes Freud, "who was her 
close friend, once heard her regret that she had not known 
psychoanalysis in her youth. But, after all, in those days there was 
no such thing" (23. 298-99): the suppression of Andreas-Salome 
contains the clue. Freudian psychoanalysis provides the new 
"construction" which allows the "silence" of the atemporal (eter-
nal) unconscious to speak. 
How did Freud and Rilke cross the "scene of transience"? In 
the episode Freud invoked the "eternal return" to rebut his two sad 
friends, representing "transience" on the one hand and "silence" 
(eternity) on the other. He ended on the note of optimism and 
serenity mentioned by his two major biographers. But in sub-
sequent references to "eternal return" Freud gave it a much darker 
meaning. It becomes associated with the uncanny, the repetition-
compulsion, and the return of the repressed, that is, regression to 
an unresolv ed conflict in one of the phases of narcissism. The 
uncanny is experienced as sudden fright, creeping horror, the 
revenant, and a blending of the unfamiliar and the familiar; its 
dream and literary representations are shadows, doubles, guard-
ian spirits, demons, and second sight. Demonic doubles in stories 
are narcissistic images which become terrible under the aspect (or 
influence) of repression: 
the subject identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in no 
doubt as to which his self is, or substitutes the extraneous self for his 
own. In other words, there is a doubling, dividing and interchang-
ing of the self. And finally there is the constant recurrence of the 
same thing -the repetition of the same features or character-traits 
or vicissitudes, of the same crimes, or even the same names through 
several consecutive generations. (17. 234) 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1919) Freud associates the "eternal 
return" with the sense of the demonic, with being pursued by a 
"malignant fate" ("fate neurosis") which is tracking down its 
victim and luring it to self-destruction (23. 21-22). Ultimately, 
"eternal return" is linked by way of narcissism to the death in-
stinct, which represents the desire to return to a preconscious 
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state, and further, to the absence of all disturbing stimuli in inani-
mate matter. As in narcissism, the eternal return betrays a compul-
sion to repeat and, arguably, an intolerance of otherness and 
difference. In the struggle between the ego and the repressed, the 
"patient's resistance arises from his ego," "the compulsion to 
repeat must be ascribed to the unconscious repressed" (23. 20). 
Rella points out that Freud's descriptions of repetition 
compulsion - "early efflorescence" of infantile sexual life is 
"doomed to extinction"-recall the natural metaphor in "Tran-
sience." 
How does the analyst treat the repetition-compulsion? Ac-
cepting the "eternal return" as the unmistakable given, the "time" 
of regression and the denial of linear time, Freud comes to terms 
with it by "allowing it to speak" in its own way, that is, through 
psychoanalysis. The patient divulges his secret thoughts, tells his 
dreams, and engages in free association: he is "obliged to repeat 
the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of, as 
the physician would prefer to see, remembering it as something 
belonging to the past." Gradually there emerges a "transference 
neurosis" forced upon the physician. The analyst tries "to keep 
this transference neurosis within the narrowest limits: to force as 
much as possible into the channel of memory and to allow as little 
as possible to emerge as repetition." The patient re-experiences his 
past with " some degree of aloofness" and he becomes able to 
"recogni ze that what appears to be reality is in fact only a reflection 
of a forgotten past." This is the condition for a successful transfer-
ence and therapy (23. 19). Rella sums up the section of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle dealing with "construction": the "present ought 
to redeem the past , but as past" (SP, 119), and hence freedom from 
repetition. 
Linear time lies in the service of the pleasure principle and of 
the ego and is a defensive construction to ward off both external 
and internal stimuli that disturb consciousness. Some internal 
stimuli are inevitably the repetition-compulsions that deny linear 
time and manifest themselves as experiences of eternal return. 
While Freud had chosen eternal return as consolation in "Tran-
sience," at least part of this choice must have been determined by 
his personal crisis and unresolved feelings, represented by and in 
the "silence" of the uncon scious and the woman, the first object of 
affection beyond the self. At this time, too, he must have recog-
nized that in its repetitiveness eternal return resembled the repeti-
tiveness of neurotic symptoms associated with narcissism. Even 
the note of hope may express his desire to break the cycle: in "Tran-
sience" he looks ahead to a time in which one is "free (in so far as 
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we are still young and active)" (14. 307). Ultimately it is his own 
invention of psychoanalysis that enables Freud to cross the "scene 
of transience." "The third way which Freud proposes is that of 
recognizing precariousness," writes Rella. Life and death are not 
opposed to one another but "make up each other and are articu-
lated by one another, in a different time" (SP, 123). This time is 
exactly what the new logos of psychoanalysis can construct. 
Rilke's "crossing" beyond transience and the Narcissus period 
was not accomplished until February 1922 when he completed his 
Elegies and wrote the Sonnets to Orpheus in a "sudden" outpouring 
of inspiration. The poems contained his resolution: the construc-
tion of a new poetic language: 
Are we, perhaps, here just for saying: House, 
Bridge, Fountain, Gate, Jug, Olive tree, Window, -
possibly: Pillar, Tower? .... but for saying, remember, 
oh, for such saying as never the things themselves 
hoped so intensely to be .... 
Here is the time for the Tellable, here is its home. 
Speak and proclaim. 
Elegy 9. 31-35 
Rilke's praise of language overcoming time is not the Renaissance 
boast of death-defying fame, but the power of language to trans-
form the experience of the transitory into its eternal significance. 
Life and death are not diametric opposites, but phases of a single 
"profound Being." The human perspective on Being is finite and 
limited, but this condition must not be regretted. Rather, it must be 
welcomed as the condition for the "fulfillment of our specifically 
human task, that of transformation. " 50 As Rilke wrote in the last 
year of his life, the poet's task is "to stamp this provisional, perish-
ing earth into ourselves so deeply, so painfully and passionately, 
that its being may rise again, 'invisibly,' in us. " 51 
Like Freud, Rilke responds obliquely to the final Chorus Mys-
ticus in Faust. The final lines of his tenth and last Elegy read: 
And yet, were they waking a likene ss within us, the endlessly dead, 
look, they'd be pointing, perhaps, to the catkins, hanging 
from empty hazels, or else they'd be meaning the rain 
that falls on the dark earth in the early Spring. 
And we, who have always thought 
of happiness climbing, would 
feel the emotion that almost startles 
when happiness falls. 
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"Endlessly" dead implicates the endlessness of being. The dead 
are "waking a likeness," are represented, as in a poem. The revela-
tion that death and life are two sides of being comes through the 
imagination. The "endlessly dead" point to the seasonal cycle 
rolling on forever, to catkins flowering from dead husks in late 
autumn, and to earth made "dark" and poisonous by rain in early 
spring (the "dark earth" is an Homeric epithet; earth is darkened 
and so nourished by warriors' blood, that is, by death). This 
awareness of the unity of being, in nature and art, "almost star-
tles," like the uncanny, with its suddenness, its (cyclical) repeti-
tion, its provocation of the instinctual desire to return to inorganic 
existence. Almost startles: it does not shock. While the psychologi-
cal train of events is similar, Rilke now acknowledges "happiness" 
or pleasure because the individual is reconciled to-in some sense, 
has willed or "constructed"-his fate. Freud said that the death 
instinct wins out because "the aim of all life is death" and that the 
satisfaction of this instinct, reducing tension to nothing, gives the 
deepest pleasure of all. But the self-preservative (erotic, outgoing, 
life-) instincts conspire so that the individual may die only in the 
way that is "immanent" within him. He must follow his own "path 
to death"; "thus these guardians of life, too, were originally the 
myrmidons of death" (18. 38-39). Both climbing on high, Goethe's 
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